Contingency plan for E. coli O157 detection in supply chains

Summary

Australia exports large quantities of beef trim and other raw group beef components to the USA. Australian product is well-regarded in this market as being safe and of high microbiological quality, thus the industry is not experienced, or well-prepared, to deal with reports from the supply chain about the detection of pathogenic E. coli (at present limited to E. coli O157, but possibly extending in future to other strains). Over the past few years, and especially since late 2007 new testing regimes have been recommended by the US FSIS, that make it more likely that pathogenic E. coli could be detected in Australian product, or linked with illnesses, or outbreaks in the USA. It is understood that rapid response to authorities and to customers in the supply chain is important in maintaining confidence in Australia's product, and a thorough response will lead to the most rapid resolution of any issue.

The issues which were addressed in this consultancy were the preparedness of the Australian industry to deal with an incident in the supply chain (from customer or regulatory authority), through the provision of generic, but specific, scientific advice on the first steps to be taken to investigate a report of an isolation of E. coli O157, and the scientific rationale for those steps and the conclusions that may or may not be reached based on the data provided.

A step-by-step technical/scientific guide for dealing with the customer/regulatory agency, was set up by Australian meat processors who were faced with a report of the isolation of E. coli O157 in, or originating from, their product. Reviews of the scientific literature, government documents, best practice guides, recommendations from authorities etc. were set up, which provided a sound basis for the proposed steps for dealing with the customer/regulatory agency. The review was also formatted into templates for scientific statements, scientific arguments etc. that may be used for communication between the Australian processor and customers, FSIS and/or AQIS.

Results

This work was commenced, but never completed, due to the export industry becoming less concerned that they were unprepared to deal with a contamination incident.